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Abstract
This study quantiﬁes dynamic learning eﬀects behind the tariﬀ wall in the Amer-
ican pig iron industry in 1870-1940. First, we present new datasets to argue that
imported and domestic pig iron were close substitutes. Next, we provide evidence
for dynamic learning eﬀects. Finally, we use the estimated learning rate to simulate
the hypothetical free trade regime starting in 1870. Despite substantial learning
at the early stage of development, free trade would have wiped out the domestic
industry by 1881. This would be caused by unfavorable shocks on demand, input
costs and transport costs.
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Pig iron is the building block of the iron and steel industry. It is a major intermediate
input used in various iron and steel mills. Moreover, the emergence of inexpensive pig
iron and steel at the end of the nineteenth century played a signiﬁcant role in American
industrialization (Wright, 1990; Irwin, 2003). By 1890, American pig iron production sur-
passed that of Great Britain, and subsequently the U.S. emerged as the leading producer
of pig iron. Pig iron received substantial protection as early as the 1820s and by 1870
the ad valorem equivalent rate of protection was almost 50 percent. The duty on pig iron
had been in place long before the invention of the Bessemer (or Kelly) process and the
discoveries of rich iron ore deposits. Nevertheless, the degree to which the domestic pig
iron industry beneﬁted from tariﬀs remains an open question.
The exploration of the so-called infant-industry hypothesis has two questions. One is
whether the industry required protection to survive on such a large scale that learning
could take place. The other is whether dynamic learning was subsequently realized.
The recent study by Irwin (2000a) focuses only on the ﬁrst question. He estimates the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported pig iron in 1867-1889 based on
the national product diﬀerentiation model by Armington (1969).1 Irwin (2000a) uses the
estimated elasticity to simulate a hypothetical free trade regime and concludes that the
domestic industry would have sustained approximately 70 percent of market share, even
if the U.S. had moved to free trade in 1869. Based on this result, he proceeds to dismiss
the importance of dynamic learning eﬀects. Evidence for dynamic learning behind the
tariﬀ wall is presented by Head (1994) in the case of steel rails industry.2
This study examines dynamic learning behind the tariﬀ wall in the domestic pig iron
industry over the period 1870-1940. We extend the analysis up to 1940 because the time
1Irwin (2000a) uses a similar speciﬁcation to Fogel and Engerman (1969), who study pig iron industry
in the ante-bellum period.
2An alternative method to test an infant-industry hypothesis is to use a probability model to assess
the likelihood of a rise of a new industry behind tariﬀ wall, such as Irwin (2000b)
1series of domestic pig iron output displays large ﬂuctuations after 1900. The price and
shipping costs series are also volatile over this sample period. Such time series variations
are highly useful for investigating the dynamic properties of the industry. We make the
following contributions to the literature. First, we argue that despite being diﬀerentiated
products, imported and domestic pig iron of the same variety are close substitutes. This is
because pig iron is an intermediate input, the varieties of which are classiﬁed objectively
by chemical contents. The degree of product diﬀerentiation is likely to be much lower
than ﬁnal goods such as steel rails. We provide evidence that the U.S. and the U.K.
produced the same set of varieties. Based on Irwin’s (2000a) own calculation, a high
degree of substitution between imported and domestic pig iron would cause the domestic
market share to drop to 30 percent. In this case, there could have been large learning
eﬀects from 1870.
Next, we estimate the size of dynamic learning eﬀects from 1870 to 1940, using cumu-
lative industry output as the measure of experience. We ﬁnd strong evidence for learning.
The implied learning rate is 16 percent, which is close to the estimate for the semicon-
ductor industry in Irwin and Klenow (1994). We also ﬁnd strong evidence for learning
spillover from the U.K. producers. The learning rate in this case is 38 percent. Such a high
learning rate indicates that the growth of the U.K. pig iron industry actually beneﬁted
the American producers.
Finally, we use the estimated learning rate to simulate the hypothetical free trade
regime. Learning eﬀects are found to be large at the early stage of development. How-
ever, in the simulation free trade would have wiped out the domestic industry by 1881.
This striking result can be explained by unfavorable shocks as follows. First, the “iron
famine” or large positive demand shocks from 1879 to 1880 put upward pressure on price
of domestic pig iron. Second, from 1879 to 1880 the cost of coal rose as much as 34
percent, and remained at that level until 1882. Third, from 1872 to 1881 transport costs
continued to decline by as much as 350 percent. In the absence of protection, these large
2and unfavorable shocks would have removed competitiveness from the American pig iron
industry in 1881. Our result is consistent with the ﬁnding by Allen (1977), that the
productivity of the American pig iron industry began to rise substantially in the 1880s.
Our ﬁndings contrast with early work by Taussig (1915) and Temin (1964) on the
post-bellum period, which viewed the eﬀects of tariﬀs on the industry as marginal. Sun-
dararajan (1970), and Baack and Ray (1973), in contrast, ﬁnd that tariﬀs signiﬁcantly
helped expand the domestic pig iron industry in the post-bellum period. The latter two
studies also argue that domestic and imported pig iron were perfect substitutes.
The next section describes characteristics of the American pig iron industry from 1870
to 1940 and provides evidence for a high degree of substitution between imported and
domestic pig iron. In Section 3 we estimate dynamic learning eﬀects. Section 4 simulates
the hypothetical case in which pig iron duty was removed in 1870. Section 5 concludes
the analysis.
2 Characteristics of the American pig iron industry
This section gives an overview of production, trade pattern, protection and price of pig
iron.
2.1 Production
Figure 1 plots the annual pig iron output in the U.S. and the U.K.3 The domestic produc-
tion doubled in every decade from 1870 to 1890. The U.S. surpassed the U.K. and became
the world leading producer in 1890. At this point, the U.S. share in world production was
34.4 percent while the U.K. share was 29.4 percent. U.S. output slowed down during the
depression in the 1890s but resumed its growth by the end of the century.
Starting in 1900 the U.S. pig iron output was quite volatile. It expanded with periodic
3We do not exclude the production of ferro-alloys because of limitation of the data.
3contractions in 1908, 1911 and 1914. When the pig iron duty was temporarily removed in
1913, the U.S. accounted for 40 percent of world production. The U.S. share reached its
peak at 60 percent in 1918. By 1932, the U.S. output was over 4 times of the U.K. output.
After the sharp drop in 1933 during the Great Depression, the domestic output returned
to the pre-depression level in 1937. By 1940, the domestic production had tripled its 1900
level.
In terms of geographical distribution, the main locations of production moved away
from coal deposits toward iron ore deposits in the late 1870s. The reasons for this are
rising fuel economy, a fall in coal transport costs and the discovery of rich ore deposits in
the Great Lakes area, and subsequently in the South (Isard, 1948; Wright, 1986). Table
1 gives the share of major iron-producing states. In the late nineteenth century, almost
50 percent of pig iron was produced in Pennsylvania. There was a downward trend in
New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. On the contrary, the Great Lakes states and
Alabama showed an upward trend. Still, Pennsylvania was by far the most important
state by the end of the nineteenth century. By 1920, the combined share of the Great
Lakes states was 42 percent and surpassed Pennsylvania’s share. Ohio was the fastest
growing state among the Great Lakes. Alabama’s share continued to grow but remained
at 7 percent in 1940.
2.2 International trade
Domestic pig iron was produced mostly for domestic demand. The U.S. was a net importer
almost all of the time and exports remained below 3 percent of output. The U.S. was one
of the U.K. most important importers until the mid 1880s. In 1894, the U.S. became a
net exporter of pig iron for the ﬁrst time. The domestic producers produced for domestic
demand throughout 1895-1940, although the U.S. sporadically became a net exporter. By
any standard, the pig iron import substitution for the U.S. experience was a great success.
Table 2 gives the breakdown of source countries. The U.K. was the main source from
4the late nineteenth century. Although Belgium, Germany and Netherlands became net
exporters to the U.S. by 1910, their shares were far smaller than that of the U.K. British
India rose as a new source in the mid 1910s. However, the U.S. became a net exporter to
these trading partners temporarily in 1917. In the 1920s, the main sources were British
India, Great Britain and Germany. In the 1930s, the Netherlands led British India and
Canada, while the U.K. turned to import pig iron from the U.S. through the second half
of the decade.
2.3 Protection
Figure 3 depicts pig iron duty and its ad valorem equivalent. A pig iron duty was in eﬀect
through the sample period except for from 1913 to 1921, when the duty was temporarily
abolished. The duty was speciﬁc regardless of types or qualities until January 1, 1939.
From 1939, the duty applied diﬀerently to diﬀerent types. The frequent adjustments
of the duty in the 1880s and 1890s are more accurately seen as adjustments for price
changes than as actual reductions in the duty. Thus, an equivalent ad valorem equivalent
is preferable to the duty as a measure of protectiveness because it reﬂects changes in
eﬀective tariﬀs without changes in tariﬀ laws (Temin, 1964; and Sundararajan, 1970). 4
The equivalent ad valorem equivalent is calculated using series of price, collected duty
and transport costs. Note that the construction of transport costs series is discussed in
the next subsection. The ad valorem equivalent rose dramatically in the 1870s and 1880s
due to the declines in import price, peaked at 70 percent in 1883 and slowly declined in
the 1890s. Then it ﬂuctuated around 25 percent in the early twentieth century until the
removal of pig iron duty in 1913.
Although the pig iron duty was reintroduced in 1922, it did not play a signiﬁcant
role in protection of the industry as a whole. Its role was to protect the seaboard-area
producers, who were not naturally protected by high transport costs and thus faced tough
4Sundararajan (1970) suggests using “eﬀective protection rate” as a proxy for protection. The corre-
lation of his measured eﬀective protection rate and ad valorem tariﬀ is, however, as high as 0.93.
5foreign competition (Berglund and Wright, 1929: Sundararajan, 1970). The equivalent ad
valorem rate remained below 10 percent from 1922 to 1940. The reason is that domestic
producers had replaced the U.K. as the main supplier for the domestic market long before
1922. Although domestic suppliers sometimes could not meet the entire domestic demand,
import market share in domestic consumption in net terms remained lower than 2 percent
most of the time during 1889-1940.
2.4 Price
Figure 2 compares domestic prices of U.S. and U.K. pig iron.5 Domestic price of U.K.
pig iron is the sum of U.K. price adjusted by exchange rate, duty and transport costs.
The transport costs series are constructed from the shipping cost index in Mohammad
and Williamson (2004), and coal freight charge in Harley (1989), because the data on
pig iron freight charge are not available.6 The fact that the two price series in Figure 2
tracked each other closely with an 84 percent correlation after the duty was removed in
1913 indicates that the constructed transport costs series is strongly correlated with the
unobserved cost of shipping pig iron.
The protective nature of the pig iron duty was apparent from 1870 to 1885, since
domestic pig iron was more expensive than imported pig iron for the most part. However,
there were still imports of U.K. pig iron in this period. This does not necessarily imply
that the substitution between domestic and imported pig iron was less than perfect. The
imports of pig iron in this period were mainly for consumption in the Atlantic and Paciﬁc
coastal areas. Throughout the 1910s, the share of imports to Atlantic and Paciﬁc ports
accounted for more than 90 percent of the total imports 7. The primary reason for this
5The U.S. prices are no.1 Foundry price at Philadelphia for 1870-85, and Bessemer price at Chicago
for 1886-1940. The U.K. price of pig iron is no.1 Foundry price at Cleveland for 1870-85, and Cleveland
Bessemer price for 1886-1940.
6See the Appendix for details.
7The imports statistics by ports of entry are from Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United
States, Bureau of the Census.
6is the high costs of shipping pig iron from the inland furnaces to the coastal areas. This
pattern of imports is consistent with the decline of production in the New York and New
Jersey area, as indicated in Table 1.
It should be noted that the cross-country price comparison is based on a speciﬁc pair
of the same variety at one point in time. Pig iron is a diﬀerentiated products industry,
and there are various grades of pig iron being categorized by chemical contents. The next
section discusses the composition of pig iron production in detail.
2.5 Varieties, and substitution between foreign and domestic
pig iron
Pig iron is the form in which iron ﬁrst appears when smelted from its ore. It varies in
its chemical composition and is utilized for diﬀerent purposes based on these diﬀerences.
Table 3 classiﬁes various grades of pig iron by their chemical contents (Berglund and
Wright, 1929). 8 The major chemical contents determining the quality of pig iron are
carbon, silicon, manganese, phosphorus and sulphur. Carbon is the most important
element and inﬂuences hardness, malleability, magnetism and electric conductivity. The
carbon content for pig iron ranges from 3 to 4 percent. It is the high carbon content that
makes pig iron non-malleable at any temperature. One method to make it malleable is to
use high temperature without fusing. The pig iron produced by this particular method is
called malleable iron. In general, there are no monotonic relationships between a single
chemical content of pig iron and its quality, except for silicon. A higher silicon content
indicates worse quality (Kirk, 1911).
The composition of pig iron production in the U.S. and the U.K. is depicted in Figures
4 and 5. The ﬁgures do not cover the entire sample period due to data limitations. Until
1940, the major types of pig iron produced domestically were basic, Bessemer and low
8Classiﬁcation of pig iron can be done by several standards, e.g. by fuel used, etc. (See Burglund and
Wright (1929), or Kirk (1911) for details.) But those are irrelevant to the discussion in this paper.
7phosphorus, forge, foundry and malleable. The main characteristic of domestic production
is the shift in the position of the dominant grade from Bessemer and low phosphorus to
basic pig iron over the period 1900-1940. In 1900, Bessemer and low phosphorus pig iron
accounted for almost 60 percent of total production, while basic pig iron accounted for
only 8 percent. In contrast, the corresponding numbers in 1940 were 17 and 74 percent.
The production of foundry pig iron was shrinking gradually and became less signiﬁcant
than the two major grades. The combined share of all other types remained less than 10
percent throughout the forty years.
Similarly, the British producers produced basic, hematite, forge and foundry pig iron
during 1887-1906. Hematite pig iron is pig iron made from hematite ore by a Bessemer
process. The primary purpose of using hematite ore is to lower phosphorus content in
pig iron output (Carr and Taplin, 1962). For these reasons, British hematite pig iron is
considered comparable to Bessemer and low phosphorus pig iron produced domestically.
Evidently, hematite and Bessemer pig iron are used interchangeably in the discussion of
British iron trade by Jeans (1906). Forge and foundry, and hematite pig iron remained the
most important types throughout the period. The shares of forge and foundry, hematite
and basic pig iron in 1887 were 49, 41 and 6 percent of total production, respectively.
Their counterparts in 1906 were 44, 40 and 12 percent.
Based on the composition of production described above and the objectivity of the
classiﬁcation method, it is reasonable to consider pig iron in the two countries as an
almost-identically diﬀerentiated products industry. Our view is in line with the studies
that consider pig iron a homogeneous product, such as Allen (1979) and Sundararajan
(1970).
In contrast, the Armington (1969) model in Irwin (2000a) assumes that products
are distinguished by locations of production. The assumption is appropriate for some
circumstances, for example, when Steﬀan-Linder’s home market eﬀect is present. In
addition, the Armington model predicts a decline in relative prices when output and
8export expand. In our dataset, the correlation between relative output and relative price
is virtually zero and thus rejects the Armington assumption.
The Armington model was originally addressed to geographically diﬀerentiated vari-
eties of ﬁnal goods, not to intermediate inputs. The estimate of elasticity of substitution
between domestic and imported products by Shills, et al. (1986) conﬁrmed that the elas-
ticity is much higher among ﬁnal products than intermediate products. Another aspect
of locational diﬀerentiation is the currency of denomination. However, the world was in a
bimetallic and subsequently a metallic standard in Irwin’s (2000a) and our sample period.
Therefore, importing pig iron involved lower currency risks than today. Overall, we could
possibly argue that the degree of product diﬀerentiation between foreign and domestic
pig iron of the same variety is low.
Based on trade models with production diﬀerentiation, economies of scale and monop-
olistic competition along the lines of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) or Lancaster (1979), under
free trade countries specialize in diﬀerent varieties. Which country produces what vari-
eties depends on comparative advantage or diﬀerences in productivity (Helpman, 1984).
Harley (2001) provides an excellent example. He investigates British cotton textiles ex-
ports to the U.S. and other markets, to assess the comparative advantage of the U.S.
and the U.K. in the antebellum cotton textiles industry. The export data suggest that
the U.S. imported high quality cotton products from the U.K., while expanding domestic
production of low quality cotton products. The U.K., however, continued to export low
quality cotton to other countries. The trade pattern indicates that the U.K. had compar-
ative advantage in both high and low quality products. Thus, the ﬁnding supports his
hypothesis that the antebellum U.S. cotton textiles industry depended substantially on
tariﬀs to survive.
In the context of pig iron, knowledge about British exports of diﬀerent varieties is
suﬃcient to identify the U.K. comparative advantage relative to the U.S. This is because
the American pig iron was produced only for domestic use consistently throughout the
9sample period. In the late nineteenth century, the main trading partners importing pig
iron from the U.K. were Canada, India, Australia, South Africa and Argentina. 9 Unfor-
tunately, there are no bilateral data on the variety breakdown of British pig iron exports.
Nevertheless, the ﬁnding that the British industry produced pig iron of the same varieties
as the domestic industry supports the notion that imported and domestic pig iron were
close substitutes.
The assumption concerning the degree of substitutability is crucial to the impact of
protection. Irwin (2000a) shows using a simulation that when the degree of substitutabil-
ity is low, the market share of imports right after switching to a free trade regime would
be 30 percent. In the same study, the corresponding number would become 70 percent if
the degree of substitutability is high. Thus, our dataset on variety-speciﬁc output in the
U.S. and the U.K. suggests that the the latter case in Irwin (2000a) presents an accurate
picture of the essential role of protection.
3 Estimating dynamic learning eﬀects
Since protection was critical to the survival of the American pig iron industry, the beneﬁts
of protection could cumulate over time through learning-by-doing. Besides the invention of
the pneumatic or Bessemer process by Williams Kelly and Henry Bessemer, “hard driving”
has received considerable attention as the major innovation increasing the productivity of
the American pig iron producers (Allen, 1977; Temin, 1964). The hard driving technique
was pioneered by some American producers starting in 1870, and further improved in
the 1880s and 1890s. This technique allows a large amount of hot air to ﬂow into blast
furnaces at high pressure, in order to speed up the smelting process. It helps increase
output per furnace, but adding this hard driving feature to a furnace requires a large sum
of capital (Berck, 1978).
9The U.S. was also a main trading partner until the mid 1880s, and eventually almost stopped im-
porting pig iron from the U.K. in 1893-94.
10According to Berck (1978), constructing a new hard-driven furnace in Chicago in 1887
would have incurred the ﬁxed cost ranging from 180,000 to 250,000 dollars. However,
that would have saved the variable cost and yielded proﬁts as high as 130,000 dollars
in one year. Given that the estimated annual capacity of a hard-driven furnace was
43,500-52,690 gross tons, this was highly proﬁtable but risky business, because redeeming
the ﬁxed cost depended on ﬂuctuations of demand. However, pig iron duty reduced the
riskiness by restricting competition with imports and allowing the domestic producers to
sell at a high price to recover the ﬁxed cost.
As a consequence, the domestic producers could produce up to their furnace capacity
when a positive demand shock occurred. The economies of scale at the plant level were,
therefore, a direct beneﬁt from protection. Indirect eﬀects of protection are the spillovers
of learning-by-doing at the industry level. Spillovers were made possible by the institu-
tions for learning, namely the professional associations that published their reports and
provided places to exchange knowledge among engineers and iron masters. The most no-
table of these was the American Iron and Steel Association established in 1864.10 Other
related organizations were the American Institute of Mining Engineers and the United
States Association of Charcoal Iron Workers. The Transactions of the American Institute
of Mining Engineers was ﬁrst published in 1871, and the United States Association of
Charcoal Iron Workers’ Journal was published in 1880 (Gordon, 1996). Through these in-
stitutions, spillovers of learning led to further cost-saving techniques and achievements of
industry-wide economies of scale. Consequently, pig iron producers became price-setters
in imperfectly competitive markets, and operated at a large scale, along the same line as
the endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1986).
Such learning eﬀects can also spread to related industries as people respond to in-
centives (Romer, 1990). Speciﬁcally, economies of scale in pig iron production created
incentives for an expansion of investment in its inputs, particularly in the iron ore in-
10The original name was the American Iron and Associates.
11dustry. Since the capacity of the furnace and the scale of investment are closely related,
the capacity of the furnace can serve as a measure of economies of scale. However, it is
not possible to estimate dynamic learning eﬀects using capacity, because we do not have
investment data. For this reason, we employ the most common measure of economies of
scale in the literature, namely the cumulative industry output (Irwin and Klenow, 1994).
3.1 Estimating strategy
The direct way to estimate dynamic learning eﬀects is to estimate a relationship between
the cost curve and cumulative output. However, cost data are not available, so we must
indirectly estimate this from price data, as in Head (1994).
Assume that ﬁrms are price-setters. Hence, price is the product of mark-up and
marginal cost:











where Pt,d is the price of domestic pig iron, µ > 0 is the mark-up and MCt is marginal
cost. The cost function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas. Et is cumulative industry output
up to the last period. The marginal cost consists of learning eﬀects Et, prices of main
inputs, namely price of iron ore Pt,o, price of coal Pt,c, and costs of capital and labor
implicitly embodied in output Qt. The elasticity of each component is αe, αo, αc and αq,
respectively. ut is the stochastic component. The estimation equation becomes:
lnPt,d = α + αelnEt + αolnPt,o + αclnPt,c + αqlnQt + ut (2)
The most important parameter is the elasticity of price with respect to experience, or
αe. If there are dynamic learning eﬀects, αe < 0. Although an increase in output puts an
upward pressure on price, the economies of scale pushes price down in the opposite direc-
tion. In the literature on learning, one commonly used concept is the so-called “learning
12rate.” It is the rate at which the marginal cost drops following doubling cumulative out-
put. Formally, learning rate is calculated as 1 − 2αe. We estimate Equation (2) using
ordinary least squares and the instrument variable technique. The instruments used for
output are duty, price of imported coal, price of rail and domestic consumption of rail.
3.2 Estimation results
The results are tabulated in Table 4. Column 1 studies the role of cost shocks, and Column
2 includes both cost and demand shocks. Both cost and demand shocks are found to be
signiﬁcant factors driving price. In Column 3, we include the U.S. experience in the
regression. This speciﬁcation gives strong evidence for learning, and the implied learning
rate is 16 percent. The estimated learning rate is close to the 20 percent learning rate
in the semiconductor industry in Irwin and Klenow (1994). Column 4 studies learning
spillover by replacing the U.S. experience with the U.K. experience. That speciﬁcation
produces strong evidence for learning spillover with 38 percent learning rate.
4 Simulation with dynamic learning
In this section, we rely on the result in Column 3 in Table 4 to simulate the hypothet-
ical free trade regime starting in 1870. To do so, we also need the demand and supply
elasticities. The elasticity of domestic supply can be obtained as the inverse of elasticity
of price with respect to output in Equation (2). The result from Column 3 in Table 4
implies that the supply elasticity is 5.88. We set the demand elasticity to 10, to generate
the case in which protection is critical for survival of the domestic pig iron industry in
Irwin (2000a). For other elasticity parameters, we follow Irwin (2000a) as well. As for the
elasticity of foreign supply, he proposes using 15, although his estimate was 40. Irwin’s
(2000a) argument that the results do not change signiﬁcantly for elasticity values above
10 was consistent with our experiment.
13As consistency checks, Figure 6 presents the actual price of domestic pig iron and
the simulated prices in two cases: (1) protection with actual duty; and (2) free trade.
The simulated series with protection consistently track the actual series. In addition, the
simulated series with free trade are consistently below the actual series.
The main results are in Figure 7. If the U.S. moved to free trade in 1870, the import
market share in 1870 would become 70 percent as in Irwin (2000a), assuming a high degree
of substitutability between domestic and imported pig iron. Then the import market
share would sharply drop in 1870 due to strong dynamic learning eﬀects. However, the
pattern would be reversed shortly before 1880, and the domestic pig iron industry would
be completely wiped out in 1881.
There are three reasons for this striking ﬁnding. First, there were large, unanticipated
shocks to U.S. demand, or the so-called “iron famine” from the spring of 1879 until the
end of 1880. Second, the price of coal in Figure 8 jumped from 2.79 dollars per gross
ton in 1879 to 3.75 dollars per gross ton in 1880. The cost shock was as large as 34
percent and persisted until 1882. Finally, there had been persistent and large shocks on
transport costs since 1872. In Figure 8, from 1872 to 1881 transport costs had declined by
as much as 350 percent. Overall, the positive demand shocks, the positive cost shocks and
the negative shocks on transport costs would eliminate competitiveness of the American
producers in 1880 in the absence of protection.
Our result is also consistent with the ﬁnding by Allen (1977). He ﬁnds that the pro-
ductivity of the domestic pig iron industry began to rise substantially in the 1880s. Until
then protection helped isolate domestic pig iron producers from the large and unfavorable
shocks described above.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper attempts to quantify the degree to which the domestic pig iron industry
beneﬁted from protection from 1870 to 1940. We argue that the U.K. and the U.S. pig
14iron of the same variety are close substitutes, using a new dataset on variety-speciﬁc
output and classiﬁcation of varieties. That argument, together with recent work by Irwin
(2000a) suggests that a large fraction of domestic producers would not have survived free
trade, and there could be large dynamic learning eﬀects behind the tariﬀ wall.
We exploit time series variations of output, price of domestic and imported pig iron,
pig iron duty and transport costs to estimate dynamic learning eﬀects. Using cumulative
output as the measure of experience, we conﬁrm the signiﬁcance of dynamic learning
eﬀects together with demand and supply shocks. Moreover, there is also strong evidence
for learning spillover from the U.K. experience. In fact, the learning rate from the U.K.
experience is more than double the learning rate from the U.S. experience.
Finally, we incorporate dynamic learning eﬀects to simulate the hypothetical free trade
regime from 1870. Without protection the American pig iron industry would have van-
ished by 1880. Our ﬁndings support the hypothesis that protection was necessary for the
growth of the American pig iron industry. Transport costs played a signiﬁcant role be-
cause their persistent and large declines would have reduced competitiveness of domestic
producers.
Certainly, such a ceteris paribus counterfactual analysis does not capture other dy-
namic changes over this period. The exercise treats conditions in the U.K. as given. This
is not true since Allen (1979) provides evidence that by 1913 productivity of the U.K.
producers had declined signiﬁcantly. Nevertheless, the exercise oﬀers a simple way to
evaluate the role of protection in the American industrialization. A more complete analy-
sis would require substantial knowledge about the pattern of international competition
in pig iron. In our study, the estimate of foreign supply curve is based on the U.K. data
throughout the period, although potential exporters to the U.S. shifted from the U.K. to
Germany in the late nineteenth century. In the late 1920s, British India had dominated
the U.K. as the main exporter. In the 1930s, the leading exporters were British India,
Netherlands and Canada. Consequently, our current analysis underestimates the eﬀect
15of protection for the most part, as the U.K. was not always competitive and was not the
main exporter starting in the mid 1930s.
The simulation results should also be interpreted with caution, since we ignore the
geographical aspect of the American pig iron industry. Besides protection, a fraction
of the industry was naturally protected by high inland transport costs. Even without
protection, some inland producers would be able to continue their production and keep
accumulating experience and knowledge in the absence of unfavorable shocks. Still, the
learning process was national and a function of the scale of the national industry. Thus
if large and unfavorable shocks could wipe out most producers, learning would be not
possible. To evaluate whether treating the U.S. pig iron industry as an integrated national
market overestimates the importance of protection by breaking the industry into regional
markets will be a natural extension of this study.
Having concluded that the American pig iron industry expanded behind the tariﬀ
wall, our study does not imply that developing countries today will surely enjoy the
beneﬁts from protection in the same way. The primary reason is that the economic system
today is far diﬀerent from the past. For instance, international monetary arrangement is
no longer a metallic standard and importing foreign goods incurs higher currency risks
as compared to 100 years ago. Such a change certainly reduces the substitutability of
domestic goods and imports, and can undermine the import substitution policy. This is
just one possibility. If anything, the fall of transport costs have made countries prone
to foreign competition, and a large-scale investment in import-competing industries has
become riskier than in the past. These factors may partially contribute to the reason why
Latin American import substitution policies did not lead to industrial successes.
16A Data appendix
A.1 Pig iron data
The annual time series of pig iron production (imports and exports) includes Ferro-alloys
production (imports and exports). U.S. ﬁgures and their composition by grades are from
Taussig (1915), Some Aspects of the Tariﬀ Question, and the Annual Statistical Report,
American Iron and Steel Association, various issues. The composition does not include
ferro-alloys. British ﬁgures, the composition by grades, and world total are from Carr, J.
C. and W. Taplin (1962), History of the British Steel Industry.
Prices of domestic pig iron are taken from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S. and
the Annual Statistical Report, American Iron and Steel Association, various issues. They
are no. 1 Foundry price at Philadelphia for 1870-85, and Bessemer price at Chicago for
1886-1940. The U.K. prices of pig iron are from Taussig (1915) and the Annual Statistical
Report, American Iron and Steel Association. They are no. 1 Foundry price at Cleveland
for 1870-85, and Bessemer price at Cleveland for 1886-1940.
Blast furnace data, capacity and furnace consumption of ore, fuel and limestones,
are from the Annual Statistical Report, American Iron and Steel Association, and the
Bulletin, American Iron and Steel Association, various issues.
Volume of exports and imports of pig iron are from the Statistical Abstract of the
U.S., various issues. Trading partner countries are from the Annual Statistical Report,
American Iron and Steel Association, various issues. Pig iron duty is from Taussig (1915),
Berglund and Wright (1929), and Metal Statistics, American Metal Market Daily Iron
and Steel Report, various issues.
A.2 Transport cost data
There are no data on pig iron shipping costs. For this reason, we construct the transport
cost series from (1) the index of grain shipping cost in Mohammad and Williamson (2004);
17and (2) the coal shipping cost in pounds in Harley (1989). The former series is the shipping
charge applied to grain shipped on Atlantic routes from the U.S. to the U.K. Hence, we
implicitly assume a symmetric shipping charge for both outbound and inbound trips.
We calculate the shipping charge in two steps. First, we use the shipping cost index in
Mohammad and Williamson (2004) as the measure of shipping-cost inﬂation, to rescale
the cost of shipping coal in Harley (1989), given the pound-sterling cost in the initial
year. We do so because the series in Harley (1989) does not cover the entire sample
period. Next, we use the pound-dollar exchange rate to convert the shipping cost to
dollars. The exchange rate data are from Economic History Services (EH.net).
A.3 Other data
Mesabi Bessemer ore price, bituminous coal domestic price and its import price, domestic
price of steel rails and domestic consumption of steel rails are from the Statistical Abstract
of the U.S. The consumer price index is taken from the Historical Statistics of the United
States: Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census.
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Economic Review 80(4), 651–668.Table 1: Geographical distribution of the U.S. pig iron production
Year New York Pennsylvania Illinois Ohio Indiana Wisconsin Alabama
and New Jersey Michigan Minnesota
1872 0.14 0.49 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.00
1880 0.08 0.48 0.15 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02
1890 0.05 0.48 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.09
1900 0.03 0.46 0.18 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.09
1910 0.08 0.41 0.21 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.07
1920 0.07 0.38 0.23 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.06
1930 0.07 0.32 0.21 0.11 0.12 0.03 0.08
1940 0.07 0.17 0.22 0.09 0.15 0.02 0.07
Sources:
(1) The Annual Statistical Report, American Iron and Steel Association, various issues.
(2) The Annual Report of the Secretary, American Iron and Steel Association, 1875.
Figure 1: Annual output of pig iron in the U.S. and the U.K. (1,000 Gross Tons)Table 2: Country share in net imports of pig iron
Year U.K. Belgium Germany Netherlands British India Canada
1895 1.09 0 0.02 0 0 -2.40
1900 0.13 -0.13 -0.18 -0.20 0 -0.15
1905 1.47 0.05 0.10 0 0 -0.66
1910 1.22 0.01 0.02 0.01 0 -0.42
1913 0.84 -0.01 0.07 0 0 -1.65
1915 1.46 0.01 0.25 0 0.13 -0.92
1917 -0.09 0 0 -0.03 0 -0.14
1920 1.85 -0.93 -0.46 -0.66 0.06 1.46
1923 0.57 0.04 0.06 0 0.05 0.10
1925 0.28 -0.01 0.06 n.a. 0.39 -0.01
1927 0.19 -0.02 0.08 n.a. 0.56 -0.11
1930 0.11 0 0 0.05 0.88 -0.07
1933 0.04 0 0 0.44 0.44 0.08
1935 0.11 0 0.04 0.38 0.29 0.10
1937 -0.35 -0.02 0 0.04 0.10 0
1940 -0.84 -0.01 0 0 0.01 -0.04
Sources:
(1) Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, Bureau of the Census, various
issues.
(2) The Annual Statistical Report, American Iron and Steel Association, various issues.
Note: A negative sign implies an export share.Table 3: Non-ferrous content of various grades of pig iron (percentage of total content)
Name Carbon Silicon Manganese Phosphorus Sulphur
Foundry, 3-4 2.75 0.2-1.6 0.3-1.5 0.035
no.1
Foundry, 3-4 2.25 0.2-1.6 0.3-1.5 0.045
no.2
Foundry, 3-4 1.75 0.2-1.6 0.3-1.5 0.055
no.3
Foundry, 3-4 1.25 0.2-1.6 0.3-1.5 0.065
no.4
Forge iron 3-4 0.75-1.75 0.2-1.5 0.3-3.0 0.05-0.3
Bessemer, 3.5-4 0.8-2.0 0.3-0.5 Less than 0.1 0.03-0.8
acid
Bessemer, 3.5-4 Less than 1.0 1.0-2.0 1.75-3.5 Less than 0.1
basic
Open hearth, 3.5-4 0.75-2.5 0.3-0.5 Less than 0.05 Less than 0.5
acid
Open hearth, 3.5-4 Less than 1.0 1.0-2.0 0.1-2.0 Less than 0.1
basic
Source: Stoughton, Bradley. (1913) The Metallurgy of Iron and Steel, p. 8.
Figure 2: Domestic price of U.S. and U.K. pig iron (dollar)Table 4: Estimation of dynamic learning eﬀects
Variables Cost Demand Learning Learning
shocks shocks (IV) (IV) spillover(IV)
U.S. experience -0.22***
U.K. experience -0.46***
Constant 1.59*** -1.67 3.67* 7.17**
Iron ore price 0.88*** 0.62** 0.61*** 0.63***
Coal price 0.07 0.07 0.50*** 0.46***
Output 0.21** 0.17*** 7.17**
Learning rate 0.16*** 0.38***
R2 adjusted 0.71 0.67 0.78 0.77
F-statistics 58*** 19*** 21*** 21***
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent,
respectively. IV corresponds to the instrument variable technique. The instruments for
output are duty, price of imported coal, price of rail and domestic consumption of rail.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Serial correlation in errors is rejected at 1
percent.
Figure 3: Pig iron duty and its ad valorem equivalentFigure 4: Composition of U.S. pig iron output
Figure 5: Composition of U.K. pig iron outputFigure 6: Actual and simulated price series
Figure 7: Actual and simulated import market shareFigure 8: Coal price and transport costs